



‘BREXIT’: A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
Philip Arestis1 and Yiannis Kitromilides2 
 
To understand the future of the UK no matter the decision on Brexit, the authors argue 
it is imperative to understand what led to Brexit in the first place. Almost unmistakable, 
whatever the future of Brexit, the British economy is smaller because of the referendum 
to leave than it would have been otherwise.  
 
1. Introduction  
On June 23rd 2016 the UK decided in a referendum by a small but clear majority to ‘leave’ 
the European Union. This unexpected decision was preceded by several months of intense 
and polarised debate and arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of continued UK 
membership of the EU. The intense debate and fierce argument about ‘Brexit’, however, did 
not end with the announcement of the referendum result. Two related questions dominated 
the post-referendum political landscape. First, why a majority of voters in the UK, 
unexpectedly, voted for ‘Brexit’? Second, how was the referendum decision to be 
implemented?  
The two questions are closely interconnected because understanding the reasons why voters 
in the UK voted to leave the EU is helpful in formulating an answer to the question of how 
the UK should exit the EU: if we understand the main motivation for voting ‘leave’ it is 
easier to implement the type of exit that best fits the ‘will of the people’ as expressed in the 
2016 referendum. ‘Leave’ supporters, of course, question the need or indeed the usefulness, 
beyond the normal concerns of academic inquiry, of such a debate. After all, people in the 
UK voted to ‘leave’ the EU because they wanted to leave the EU and the process of leaving 
the EU is simply to leave the EU!  
 
Unfortunately, neither question can be answered in such a simple and straightforward way. 
The Lisbon treaty of 2009 stipulates that for a member state to leave the EU it must first 
trigger article 50, “in accordance with its own constitutional requirements” and negotiate an 
agreement about the “arrangements for its withdrawal” within a period of two years. Given 
that no full member ever exited the EU, this process was and still is, uncharted territory. 
Some of the legal and political complexities of triggering article 50 have escaped notice and, 
therefore, debate during the referendum campaign. For example, what were the 
“constitutional requirements” in the UK for triggering article 50?  After a legal challenge and 
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an acrimonious legal battle, the constitutional issue was finally settled by the UK Supreme 
Court ruling that Parliament should trigger article 50. 
 
This, however, did not put an end to the political wrangling about what should happen after 
article 50 is triggered. A ‘negotiated exit’ means that the UK can, in principle, negotiate a 
‘soft’, a ‘hard’ or a ‘com promise’ Brexit and remain consistent with the referendum 
instruction of exiting the EU.  The process of ‘leaving’ the EU turned out to be far more 
complicated than anyone anticipated during the referendum campaign.  
Analysing the reasons why voters in the UK voted for Brexit is also important because the 
‘Brexit’ referendum decision may have been due to the emergence of a much wider political 
phenomenon often referred to as populism, affecting voter behaviour beyond the UK. This 
wider issue of the spread of populism is beyond the scope of this paper, which is concerned 
mainly with developments in post-2016 referendum UK. Section 2 examines the why 
question and concentrates on the issue of immigration and its possible crucial impact on the 
referendum result.  Section 3 considers an additional contributory factor in explaining Brexit 
referendum result: the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the ‘remain’ campaign. Section 4 
reviews the protracted debate on how the ‘will of the people’ is to be implemented and some 
concluding thoughts are presented in section 5. 
2.  Why ‘Brexit’? 
A widely accepted explanation for the unexpected electoral outcome of the June 2016 
referendum on continued UK membership of the EU, is based on the so called ‘angry voters’ 
theory. The ‘angry voters’ were losers from the effects of globalisation and of the Great 
Recession, who felt that their ‘concerns’ have been persistently ignored by ‘liberal elites’, 
generating an anti-establishment sentiment. These were popular ‘concerns’ relating to 
economic insecurity but also to perceptions that low wages, shortages in housing, education 
and health care were primarily due to immigration. Such concerns could easily be exploited 
by populist politicians using familiar tactics: demagoguery, lies, deceptions, over-
simplifications combined with scapegoating and appeals to nationalism and nativism. Was the 
‘leave’ campaign a populist campaign? 
There is no doubt that leaders of the ‘leave’ campaign claimed to be articulating the concerns 
of ‘the people’ about Europe and particularly about immigration.  Mr Michael Gove, a 
cabinet minister and leading ‘leave’ campaigner, declared in one of the televised debates that 
he was ‘on the side of the people against the elites’ and that ‘we have had enough of experts. 
Populists tend to subscribe to ‘conspiracy theories’ and Mr Gove was suggesting that many 
independent economic organisations ‘conspired’ to distort the truth about the economic 
uncertainties of ‘Brexit’.  One of the achievements of the ‘leave’ campaign was that it 
successfully shifted the debate away from the uncertain economic consequences of ‘Brexit’ 
(‘we have had enough of experts’) to the certainty of re-gaining control of national borders 
through ‘Brexit’ (‘no unrestricted immigration’). The message was that voting ‘leave’ was 
patriotic, rational and non-racist. In the next section, we will discuss how and why this 




 2.1 Immigration: The Story of Two Conversations 
During the 2010 general election campaign in the UK the leader of the Labour party Gordon 
Brown, was recorded on camera having a conversation with Mrs Gillian Duffy, a lifelong 
labour party supporter and voter. After this conversation, Mr Brown returned to his car but 
forgot to switch off his microphone and was recorded describing Mrs Duffy as ‘that bigoted 
woman’. During their conversation, Mrs Duffy raised several issues including immigration. 
She stated that “you can’t say anything about the immigrants” but she was wondering about 
all these Eastern Europeans who were coming into the country. “Where are they flocking 
from?”, she asked.  Mr Brown tried to address her concerns by explaining that EU migration 
was a two-way process with many UK citizens living in EU countries. The conversation 
between Mr Brown and Mrs Duffy would have probably gone completely unnoticed had Mr 
Brown not forgotten to switch off his microphone. By describing Mrs Duffy as a ‘bigoted 
woman’ the incident became headline news but EU migration did not become a major 
election issue. Mr Brown apologised personally to Mrs Duffy and the economy remained the 
dominant election issue in 2010. 
A few decades earlier another conversation took place between a conservative politician, Mr 
Enoch Powel, and one of his constituents. This conversation was never recorded but it was 
recounted by Mr Powel himself in a speech in Birmingham on the 20th of April, 1968. In this 
speech, which subsequently became known as the ‘rivers of blood’ speech, Mr Powel 
repeated a conversation he had with one of his constituents, “a middle-aged, quite ordinary 
working man employed in one of our nationalised industries”. The constituent told Mr Powel 
that if he had the money he wouldn’t stay in this country because “in 15 or 20 years’ time the 
black man will have the whip hand over the white man”.  
Mr Powel, unlike Mr Brown, did not find the views expressed by his constituent in any way 
objectionable. On the contrary, he thought the constituent was “a decent, ordinary fellow 
Englishman” saying what hundreds of thousands of citizens in the country were saying and 
thinking. It was his duty not to ignore these views which as it happened coincided with his 
own views on the matter of ‘commonwealth’ immigration: there were already too many 
‘commonwealth’ immigrants in the country and it was ‘madness’ to permit the continued 
‘influx’ of dependents which will result in an even larger immigrant and ‘immigrant-
descended’ population. The simple and rational solution   was to stop the inflow and promote 
the maximum outflow of immigrants. Failure to implement this policy urgently was like 
watching a nation “busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre”. Looking ahead, Mr 
Powel was filled with foreboding like the Roman who saw “the river Tiber foaming with 
much blood”. 
Enoch Powel was dismissed from the shadow cabinet by the then conservative party leader 
Mr Edward Heath following his ‘inflammatory’ speech. His views were widely condemned 
and his pessimism about the future of race relations in the UK was rejected by all major 
political parties. Multiculturalism was embraced by mainstream politics and Enoch Powel 
was politically marginalised.  It could be argued that he was the victim of his own success.  




in 1970 which ensured Powel’s political demise. His views on immigration, however, 
resonated with the public at large with opinion polls consistently showing large majorities in 
favour of his proposed policies on immigration.  
Opinion polls are of course, opinion polls, not an actual election result. In the intervening 
period between the ‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968 and the ‘bigoted woman’ incident in 
2010, the strength of public opinion on immigration policy was never directly tested, either in 
the form of a national referendum on immigration policy or a general election dominated by 
the issue of immigration. Things were about to change with the 2015 general election in the 
UK. 
In 2015 the conservative party included in its election manifesto the promise of a referendum 
on continued UK membership of the EU. Having unexpectedly achieved an overall majority 
in the general election of 2015, Mr David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, fulfilled his 
manifesto promise by announcing that a referendum on continued EU membership was to 
take place on the 23rd of June 2016. The UK voters had to decide whether they wanted to 
‘remain’ in or ‘leave’ the EU.  
What is the connection between a referendum on continued EU membership and immigration 
policy? There is, of course, a clear connection between the two because continued 
membership of the EU entails un-restricted and un-controlled migration from the EU. How 
significant was this connection during the 2016 referendum? The question on the ballot paper 
was simply: do you want to ‘remain’ or ‘leave’ the EU?  Although at the early stages of the 
campaign the debate was dominated by the economy, it seems that towards the end of the 
campaign the debate was in fact transformed into a debate on immigration policy. It was as if 
the referendum question effectively changed to the following simple choice: do you want to 
‘remain’ in the EU and have un-restricted immigration from the EU or do you want to ‘leave’ 
and regain control over immigration into your country from the EU? People’s concerns about 
immigration once again came to the fore. 
2.2 Addressing People’s Concerns on Immigration 
The Government in its White Paper on ‘Brexit’ states that record levels of net migration in 
the UK over the last ten years “has given rise to public concern about pressure on public 
services, like schools and our infrastructure, especially housing, as well as placing downward 
pressure on wages for people on the lowest incomes. The public must have confidence in our 
ability to control immigration. It is simply not possible to control immigration overall when 
there is unlimited free movement of people to the UK from the EU” (see, also Whyman and 
Petrescu, 2017, chapter 6).  
People’s ‘concerns’ about immigration, have not changed dramatically during that long 
period between the ‘rivers of blood’ speech and ‘Brexit’. Enoch Powel’s concerns were about 
‘Commonwealth’ immigration; those of the ‘Brexiters’ in the 2016 referendum were 
primarily about ‘European Union’ migration. The concerns themselves, however, remained 
remarkably very similar. These were typically concerns about (a) the total number of 




immigrant and ‘immigrant descended’ population; and (d) the overall impact on jobs, wages, 
housing, education, health care and social services as well as the non-economic impact of 
immigration on the overall culture, social cohesion and national identity of the country.  
Following Enoch Powel’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech, a political consensus emerged in the UK 
whereby these popular concerns about immigration were addressed and debated without 
using inflammatory language like: “the black man will have the whip hand over the white 
man” or that it is ‘madness’ not to stop the inflow and maximise the outflow of immigrants. 
Although overtly racist and xenophobic discussion of immigration was virtually confined to 
the extreme right-wing fringe of politics, nevertheless a certain degree of uneasiness was still 
present in public discussions about immigration. There was always apprehension that 
expressing an anti-immigration view could be linked to racism, xenophobia and prejudice.  
The significance of the 2016 referendum was that, for the first time in a national election, this 
link appears to have been decisively broken. In 2016 voters like Mrs Duffy could express 
opposition to immigration without being described as bigots. The ‘leave’ campaign presented 
a political demand on immigration that aimed at putting an end to unlimited free movement 
of people from the EU to the UK. The ‘leave’ campaign insisted that this demand was not 
based either on prejudice or ignorance. It was not directed against EU immigrants per se, but 
against un-restricted, un-limited and un-controlled EU immigration.  It was also not based on 
a failure to understand and acknowledge the valuable contribution of immigration, past 
present and future, to the UK economy and society. It was a rational, no-racist and patriotic 
demand that a sovereign nation state should be able to enjoy the benefits of immigration 
without subscribing to unlimited free movement of people.  It was, therefore, up to the 
‘remain’ campaign to provide a credible alternative narrative on immigration and a 
convincing justification as to why free movement of people was indeed a good idea. 
3. Europe and the UK: The Dangers of ‘Semi-Detachment’ 
The EU is not just an economic union but also a political project as well. It is generally 
known as the ‘European Project’. A central element of the ‘European Project’ is the 
aspiration, expressed in the opening sentence of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and repeated 
subsequently in all important EU treaties, of ‘an ever-closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’. Although this aspiration has never been precisely defined, it is generally assumed to 
mean the prospect of establishing greater economic and political integration in Europe which 
may eventually take the form of a European ‘supra’ national or federal state.  
The UK’s attitude towards the ‘European Project’ was mostly problematic. It was at best 
ambivalent and at worst openly hostile. Its initial hostility took the form of a refusal to join 
the original six European nations that formed the European Common Market in 1957, 
preferring to join the EFTA, a trading block without aspirations of eventual political 
unification. Even after becoming a full member, under both labour and conservative 
governments, the UK’s attitude towards the ‘European Project’ remained decidedly 
lukewarm and un-enthusiastic. This attitude of ‘semi-detachment’ took the form of various 




pushing the EU towards greater political integration such as the single currency and the 
abolition of borders through the Schengen agreement. Eventually, the UK’s position of ‘semi-
detachment’ from Europe was formalised when David Cameron negotiated in 2016, prior to 
the referendum, an ‘opt-out’ from the requirement to participate in the creation of ‘an ever-
closer union’. 
The Cameron ‘opt-out’ did not provoke any noticeable negative reaction from leading pro-
Europeans in other political parties in the UK. In fact, it was viewed overall as a welcome 
strategic move. It provided the ‘remain’ side with an excuse not to discuss and to defend a 
seemingly unpopular cause and deprived the ‘leave’ side of a potent, from their perspective, 
debating argument concerning the political future of Europe. There was little point in 
discussing an issue on which both sides appear to be in broad agreement: ‘an ever-closer 
union’ was not a good idea.  However, once ‘unrestricted’ immigration from the EU became a 
central issue in the campaign, this strategy backfired.  If ‘an ever-closer union’ is a bad idea 
why is ‘free movement of people’ a good idea?  
The European Single Market requires its members, which need not necessarily be member 
states of the European Union, to adhere to the so called ‘four freedoms’, the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and people. What is the reasoning behind this supposedly non-
negotiable and inviolable rule? Economists since Adam Smith have argued that the economic 
benefits from the free flow of goods, services and capital can only be fully achieved if there is 
also free movement of labour. In fact, any restriction on the free movement of any single 
component of the four freedoms could have adverse repercussions on the others. From the 
standpoint of economics, the ‘four freedoms’ are inseparable. There is also a political 
justification for the ‘four freedoms’, however, which is arguably more significant than the 
economic one.  
It makes economic sense to have free movement of labour when goods, services and capital 
move freely. It also makes sense in terms of economic efficiency to have a single currency for 
all transactions within a single market as well as not having costly border controls when 
crossing national boundaries. This is how a single market operates within a nation state. In a 
national market, there is a common currency, there are no internal borders and therefore no 
border controls and there is complete freedom of movement. Significantly, in a national 
market there is free movement of people, not just free movement of labour or economically 
active persons. This does not necessarily mean that the creation of a single market of several 
sovereign nation states in Europe must replicate the way a single market operates within a 
nation state. Yet this is effectively what the European political leaders who signed in 1992 the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU), also known as the Maastricht Treaty, decided to do.  
The TEU laid the foundations for the current system of governance of the EU and the single 
market. The two most important and far reaching decisions of the TEU were first, the 
establishment of European Citizenship and second, the establishment of the completion of 
Economic and Monetary Union as a formal objective of the EU. The first decision established 
the principle of the ‘free movement of people’ within the EU and the second led to the 
creation of a ‘single currency’. Both are usual features of a single market within a nation state 




states.  Indeed, currently the UK and other states participate fully in the single market without 
a common currency. The introduction of ‘free movement of people’ and a ‘single currency’ 
had more to do with politics rather than economics. It related to the vision of a politically 
united Europe. It was intended to advance the aspiration of ‘an ever-closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’ and contribute towards the achievement of greater political integration in 
the EU.  
Since 1992, ‘free movement of people’ and a ‘single currency’ became a reality in the EU. 
The long-term viability of both, however, is now being questioned because of lack of 
progress in the process of political integration.  The euro-zone crisis demonstrated vividly the 
immense problems that can emerge by operating a monetary union without a political union 
while the ‘Brexit’ crisis raised similar concerns about ‘free movement of people’. Many of 
the current problems that threaten the stability and the very existence of the EU, such as fiscal 
transfers, sovereign bail-outs and free unrestricted movement of people, would not be so 
intensely divisive issues in a federal political system.  In this sense an ‘ever closer union’ is 
part of the solution and not part of the problem with EU membership. The problem is that 
there is no clear road map as to how this is to be achieved. The shock of the ‘Brexit’ decision 
in the UK brought to the fore the existing tensions in the EU as to how the European project 
is to be completed. These tensions between federalists and anti-federalists had their 
counterparts in the UK referendum campaign. 
The populism of the ‘leave’ campaign was undoubtedly a significant factor that led to the 
‘Brexit’ result. Many of the conditions for the emergence of a classic populist campaign were 
present. There was disillusionment and discontent among losers from globalisation who 
experienced wage stagnation and economic insecurity, which in turn generated an anti- 
establishment sentiment exploited by right-wing populists using familiar tactics. The ‘leave’ 
campaign, however, claimed, above all, to be articulating the concerns of ‘the people’ about 
unrestricted EU migration, successfully shifting the debate away from the economic 
uncertainties of ‘Brexit’ to the certainty of re-gaining control of national borders. During the 
campaign, however, the passionate anti-Europeanism of the ‘leave’ side was not matched by 
an equally passionate and enthusiastic pro-European stance by the ‘remain’ side.  
The pro- European side could not provide a credible and principled defence of the central 
issue of the campaign concerning the ‘free movement of people’ because a large majority of 
the ‘remain’ side never fully subscribed to the ideal of a politically united Europe - an ideal 
upon which the concept of European citizenship was based. The Eurosceptic opposition to an 
‘ever-closer union’ was consistent with rejecting ‘unrestricted’ migration; the opposition to an 
‘ever closer union’ by the ‘remain’ side was not consistent with accepting ‘unrestricted’ EU 
migration.  The ‘remain’ side must, therefore, accept its share of responsibility for the ‘Brexit’ 
electoral outcome.  
For the ‘remain’ side supporting the idea of freedom of movement of people in the EU was a 
case of ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’. A more robust and principled pro-
Europeanism during the referendum campaign would not have been perceived as genuine and 




people, however, was inconsistent. In this sense, once the decision was taken to hold a 
referendum on continued membership of the EU, ‘Brexit’ was an accident waiting to happen. 
The ‘remain’ side possibly over-estimated its ability to sell the message to the British voters 
that it was worth staying in a club with unacceptable and unpalatable rules for purely 
economic benefit.  A majority of UK voters decided that accepting the club rules was too high 
a price to pay for continued membership of the club. 
Another metaphor used to describe the troubled relationship between the UK and the EU is 
the ‘marriage’ metaphor. The ‘leave’ campaign wanted a ‘divorce’, citing ‘irreconcilable 
differences’ and insisting that a ‘divorce’ was a better option than remaining in an unhappy, 
‘loveless’ marriage. An ‘amicable’ divorce would enable both parties to have a fresh start. 
The ‘remain’ side, on the other hand, appeared to be satisfied with a ‘marriage of 
convenience’, arguing unconvincingly that the ‘loveless’ marriage had a long- term future. A 
‘love affair’ with the European Project is clearly not essential in order to remain a member of 
the EU but some affinity and connection with the project would have been helpful in 
defending in a referendum the fundamental principle of free movement of people in the EU. 
The ‘remain’ campaign could not present the principle as part of a wider ideal, having ‘opted-
out’ from the aspiration of ‘an ever-closer union’.  At best it was defended as part of a general 
commitment to ‘internationalism’ but more frequently as simply a ‘necessary evil’ or a ‘price 
to be paid’ for the economic benefits of membership of the single market. Decades of ‘semi-
detachment’ from the European Project by the pro-European side in the UK had its 
consequences.   
4. The Implementation of the ‘Will of the People’ 
In the 2016 referendum, the question on the ballot paper was simply: do you want to ‘remain’ 
or ‘leave’ the EU?  Although voters were asked a simple question, deciding on the answer to 
this question was not an easy or simple matter. There were, clearly, several different complex 
dimensions which had to be considered, such as the uncertain economic consequences of exit, 
the cost of EU membership, its effects on national sovereignty and national identity and, of 
course, immigration. 
Voters, whether in a general election or in a referendum, are simply asked to cast a vote; they 
are not asked to explain and give reasons why they voted one way or another. We can, 
therefore, only speculate as to what the dominant consideration or concern was in people’s 
minds when casting their vote on June 23rd 2016 in the EU referendum.  Normally, of course, 
the only thing that matters, in an election, is its outcome. What is beyond any doubt is that in 
the EU referendum a majority in the UK voted to ‘leave’ the EU. However, given that after 
triggering article 50, there were alternative pathways to exiting the EU, it is important that 
those entrusted with negotiating the implementation of the ‘will of the people’, as expressed 
in the referendum, knew what type of ‘Brexit’ people voted for. 
The leadership of the ‘leave’ campaign was in no doubt that the majority voted not only to 
exit the EU but also to put an end to the free movement of people from the EU into the UK, 




regain control of the UK’s ability to conduct independent trade deals around the world. This 
interpretation of the referendum result was endorsed by the Prime Minister in her Lancaster 
House speech on 17 January 2017.  Mrs May claimed that what the British people voted in 
the EU referendum was for what has come to be known as a ‘hard’ Brexit. This means that 
after ‘Brexit’ the UK must leave the Single Market and the Customs Union. To do otherwise 
would be undemocratic and contrary to the ‘will of the people’. 
There was, indeed, a clear, unambiguous and democratically expressed view that the UK 
should ‘leave’ the EU. Was there a similar majority view about ending free movement of 
people and therefore exiting the Single Market, membership of which requires acceptance of 
free movement? The 48% that voted ‘remain’ clearly accepted ‘free movement’ as a 
condition of EU membership. To claim that the referendum result indicates that a majority of 
British voters was also opposed to free movement of people it must be assumed that all, or 
nearly all, of the 52% that voted ‘leave’ also wanted an end to the free movement of people 
from the EU into the UK. This may, of course, be a reasonable or even a realistic assumption.  
It is not possible, however, to claim with certainty that a democratic majority voted in favour 
of ending the free movement of people. It is entirely possible that some of the people who 
voted ‘leave’ were not against free movement of people. 
The Prime Minister in her Lancaster House speech argued that exiting the EU but remaining 
in the single market “would to all intends and purposes mean not leaving the EU at all” and 
therefore voters knew perfectly well that “a vote to leave the EU would be a vote to leave the 
Single Market”. The possibility, however, that a small but unknown fraction of ‘leavers’ had 
no problem with free movement of people cannot be ruled out. Some voters, for example, 
may have been impressed with the so called ‘Norwegian Model’. Norway, an independent, 
sovereign nation, decided through a referendum in 1994 to remain outside the EU but is 
maintaining economic links with Europe through membership of the European Economic 
Area. Could it be the case that a fraction of ‘leave’ voters, for whatever reason, were not 
opposed to free movement of people? There is no hard evidence about the size of this fraction 
of un-typical ‘leave’ voters but it would be fair to assume that it was probably relatively 
small. If there was a huge majority in favour of ‘leave’, this consideration could be dismissed 
as trivial and insignificant and be ignored. Given how small the ‘leave’ majority was, 
however, it would require only a small swing among ‘leave’ voters to eliminate the presumed 
majority for a ‘hard’ Brexit. It is not possible, therefore, to claim with certainty that a 
democratic majority of the British people voted in 2016 for a ‘hard’ Brexit. Yet this is what 
the British Prime Minister claimed in her Lancaster House speech. Mrs May in formulating 
the government’s strategy for the ‘Brexit’ negotiations was indeed acting, as if the 2016 
referendum produced a landslide victory for the ‘leave’ side.  
 
 




The UK is a parliamentary democracy in which, in line with most advanced democracies in 
the world, virtually all decisions of government are taken not directly by the people but 
indirectly by the people’s representatives. The government is accountable to Parliament and 
ultimately to the people in general elections. There is no constitutional requirement or 
convention for national referenda in the UK. A sovereign Parliament can decide at any time 
to have a referendum on any issue by passing a referendum law. Parliament, however, used 
this option of national decision making only three times in the UK’s long history of 
democratic politics, in 1975 (on remaining in what was then the EEC), in 2011 (on the 
alterative voting system) and in 2016 (on Brexit). The decision to join the European 
Economic Community was not taken by means of a national referendum. The UK joined the 
EEC because in 1970 it elected a conservative government that had a commitment in its 
election manifesto that it would apply for membership of the EEC. On 1 January 1973 the 
UK joined the EEC because Parliament approved the negotiated terms of entry. It is not 
entirely clear what role Parliament would play in the process of approving the terms of 
exiting the EU. The previous two referenda produced decisive results in the form of super-
majorities of about 67%, in support of maintaining the status quo which was also supported 
by a majority in Parliament. The ‘will of the people’ and the ‘will of Parliament’ happily 
coincided. The 2016 Brexit referendum, however, produced a result, by a small majority, that 
put a wedge between the ‘will of the people’ and the wishes of the people’s representative in 
Parliament. There is currently in the UK without doubt a serious conflict between direct and 
indirect democracy. 
In a representative democracy politics is often described as the ‘art of the possible’. 
Compromise, mutual accommodation and give-and-take are common features of 
contemporary politics. This is inevitable if the danger of what John Stuart Mill called the 
‘tyranny of the majority’ is to be avoided. A referendum, however, as a means of national 
decision-making, leaves very little room for compromises. It promotes a ‘winner-takes-all’ 
mentality, which insists on the minority accepting completely the will of the majority. ‘The 
people have spoken’ is a phrase often used by the victors in a referendum to emphasise that 
the rest of ‘the people’ must submit to the will of the majority. For this reason, a second 
referendum on the terms of exiting the EU would do nothing to help finding the compromise 
that is necessary to solve the political turmoil and constitutional upheaval created by the 
UK’s unnecessary, flawed and ill-prepared first referendum in 2016.  
If a second referendum reverses, probably by a small margin, the result of the first 
referendum the victors will almost certainly adopt the same uncompromising attitude, 
insisting on ‘remaining’ when nearly half of the people want to ‘leave’. The losers will feel 
cheated and betrayed and the resentment of those who had voted ‘leave’ because they wanted 
to express an anti-establishment sentiment, will be increased.  The polarisation in the country 
will be magnified and enhanced. If, on the other hand, the second referendum replicates the 
result of the first, it will simply re-enforce and solidify the ‘winner-takes-all’ attitude on the 
‘leave’ side thus destroying any chance of a political compromise on this issue. 
The 2016 referendum will probably prove to be for the UK a costly mistake and a far cry 




settle, ‘once-and-for all’, the question that caused perennial divisions within his party 
concerning the UK’s relationship with the EU. The EU referendum not only failed to end 
conflict and division within the conservative party but extended these conflicts and divisions 
to the rest of the society in the UK.  
The ‘remainers’ view Brexit as a national calamity that must be prevented while ‘leavers’ 
consider a reversal of Brexit as a shameful betrayal of democracy. The chasm between the 
two sides is huge and, without both sides abandoning their entrenched positions, seemingly 
unbridgeable. A ‘soft’ Brexit whereby the UK formally ‘leaves’ the EU but ‘remains’ in the 
customs union and or single market beyond the end of the transition period, is an obvious 
and, perhaps the only, plausible compromise. This, of course, is not ideal for either 
‘remainers’ or ‘leavers’; but compromises never are. It is interesting to note at this stage the 
findings of the The Office for Budget Responsibility reported on the 29th of October on the 
UK economic and fiscal outlook. It stated that the UK “economy was 2% to 2.5% smaller by 
mid-2018 than it would have been if the referendum had not been called”. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Two broad but related questions seem to dominate public debate in post- ‘Brexit’ referendum 
UK. First, why the British people, against all expectations, voted to leave the EU; and second, 
how is this unprecedented decision to be implemented? Regarding the first question, many 
elements and features of the EU referendum campaign in 2016, fit in well with the narrative 
that ‘populism’ played a pivotal part in producing the unexpected ‘Brexit’ result. The 
circumstances of the campaign fulfilled many of the preconditions for the emergence of a 
‘populist’ style of political action. There was disillusionment and discontent among ‘angry’ 
voters, whose ‘concerns’ have been ignored by ‘liberal elites’ and mainstream politics, 
generating an anti-establishment sentiment. It is this sentiment that can be exploited by 
populists through demagogic promises and over-simplifications combined with scapegoating, 
appeals to nationalism and nativism. The concerns that mainstream politics appeared to have 
been ignoring were particularly relevant in the area of immigration policy. There was 
widespread concern, especially among working class communities that low wages, housing 
shortages, problems in health care, education and other public services were mainly due to 
the ‘influx’ of record levels of EU migrants. The ‘leave’ campaign, claiming to be the 
genuine ‘voice’ of the people on this issue, argued that the only way that the people’s 
concerns about immigration could be adequately addressed was by exiting the EU. 
This is not the first time that British politicians claimed to be expressing the views of 
ordinary people on immigration policy. Enoch Powel was a famous case in point whose vies 
were rejected by mainstream politics as inflammatory, racists and xenophobic. During the 
2016 referendum campaign, however, for the first time the link between an anti-immigration 
stance and racism and xenophobia was broken. The ‘leave’ campaign drew a distinction 
between being against immigration and being against ‘uncontrolled’ immigration. This meant 
that the slogan ‘we want our country back’ can be presented as an expression of a rational, 
non- prejudiced and ignorant, demand. Wanting to re-gain control over national borders is not 




contribution that immigration can bring to an economy and society. It was simply the desire 
by a sovereign nation state to be able to determine for itself the type and quantity of 
immigrants that it wants to allow into the country.  
The passionate and enthusiastic opposition to ‘uncontrolled’ immigration staged by the 
‘leave’ campaign was not matched by an equally passionate and enthusiastic defence of the 
principle of free movement of people in the EU by the ‘remain’ side. It appears that the pro-
European side in the referendum campaign was caught between a rock and a hard place. After 
years of ‘semi-detachment’ from the European Project it was not possible to offer a credible 
and principled explanation as to why free movement of people considered by the EU to 
constitute an ‘inviolable’ rule; vital for the preservation of the integrity of the single market, 
was indeed a good idea. Opting-out of the aspiration of ‘an ever-closer union’, following 
previous opt-outs from the single currency and Schengen, did not make it any easier for the 
‘remain’ campaign to provide such an explanation. The unexpected electoral outcome of the 
EU referendum, therefore, may have as much to do with the skilful manipulation of the 
immigration issue by the ‘leave’ campaign as with the failure of the ‘remain’ side to provide 
a credible alternative narrative about free movement of people in the EU. 
The academic analysis of the 2016 EU referendum is still on going and in due course we may 
have more definitive answers, to the extent that this is possible, to the why question. If, 
however, we assume that the issue of free movement of people was crucial in determining the 
outcome of the referendum, does this not mean that the answer to the how question is fairly 
straightforward? If people voted to end ‘unrestricted and uncontrolled’ immigration, the UK 
should exit the EU and the Single Market. This is the assumption adopted by the Prime 
Minister who in her Lancaster House speech declared that “we do not seek membership of 
the Single Market. Instead we seek the greatest possible access to it through a new, 
comprehensive, bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement”. This new agreement would 
therefore preclude membership of the Single Market. 
At the time of writing and as the article 50 process reaches its final stage, it is possible that 
the UK government may, under pressure from Parliament, abandon some of its ‘hard’ Brexit 
red lines as modified by the so called Chequers agreement and reach a compromise in the 
final withdrawal agreement with the EU; in which the will of the majority of the people to 
‘leave’ the EU and the will of the majority of MPs of minimising the damage of exiting the 
EU may coincide.  
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